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Abstract
Meier (2008) shows that the universal knowledge-belief space ex-
ists. However, besides the universality there is an other important
property might be imposed on knowledge-belief spaces, inherited also
from type spaces, the completeness. In this paper we introduce the
notion of complete knowledge-belief space, and demonstrate that the
universal knowledge-belief space is not complete, that is, some subjec-
tive beliefs (probability measures) on the universal knowledge-belief
space are not knowledge-belief types.
Keywords and phrases: Belief; Knowledge; Uncertainty; Com-
plete type space; Complete knowledge space; Universal type space;
Universal knowledge space; Games of incomplete information.
JEL codes: C70; C72; D80; D82; D83
1 Introduction
For modeling incomplete information situations Harsa´nyi (1967-68) suggests
the use of types instead of hierarchies of beliefs. Summing up his concept
very roughly, it is the goal to substitute the belief hierarchies by types, to
collect all types in an object, and consider the probability measures on this
object as the players’ (subjective) beliefs.
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In the case of beliefs Harsa´nyi’s program above is completed, Heifetz
and Samet (1998b) demonstrates the existence of the (purely measurable)
universal type space (the object into which all types are collected), Meier
(2001) shows that the universal type space is complete (every probability
measure on that is a type), and last Pinte´r (2008) proves that the complete
universal type space contains all hierarchies of beliefs.
It is possible to extend type spaces in such a way that those represent not
only the beliefs, but the knowledges of the players as well. This extension is
called knowledge-belief space.
Meier (2008) introduces the notion of knowledge-beliefs space, and he suc-
ceeds in avoiding the traps of the earlier negative results (Heifetz and Samet
(1998a) and Brandenburger and Keisler (2006) among others), and shows
that the universal knowledge-belief space exists and, naturally, is unique.
This important result has been reached by a new, strict, but reasonable def-
inition of knowledge operator (for the details consult with Meier (2008)’s
paper).
It is a natural step forward examining the completeness of the universal
knowledge-belief space. For type spaces Brandenburger (2003) introduces
the notion of completeness, a type space is complete, if for any subjective
belief (probability measure) expressible in the model, there is a type which
“means“ the given subjective belief (see e.g. Pinte´r (2008)). The complete-
ness is important because it ensures that we can take any probability mea-
sure (subjective belief), we need not choose of the possible subjective beliefs,
which was Harsa´nyi’s original goal too.
In this paper we consider Meier (2008)’s universal knowledge-belief space
and conclude that is not complete, that is, there are some probability mea-
sures (subjective beliefs) on it which cannot be represented by knowledge-
belief types.
Our result can be summarized as follows. In the universal knowledge-
belief space there is an event (measurable set) which represents kj(ki(ϕ)),
that is, player j knows that player i knows that event ϕ happens, and there
is an other which represents kj(ki(¬ϕ)), that is, player j knows that player
i knows that event ϕ does not happen. However, a probability measure that
evaluates these two (disjoint) events equally cannot be in the knowledge-belief
space, since b
1
2
i (kj(ki(ϕ))), that is, player i believes with at least probability
of a half that player j knows that player i knows that event ϕ happens, and
b
1
2
i (kj(ki(¬ϕ))), that is, player i believes with at least probability of a half
that player j knows that player i knows that event ϕ does not happen, are
not consistent knowledge-belief expressions, therefore, they cannot be in any
state of the world in any knowledge-belief space.
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One can see our result in two ways (at least). First, one can interpret
our result as the notion of completeness we recommend for the universal
knowledge-belief space is futile, not reasonable, since it goes against the very
structure of knowledge-belief spaces. However, the notion of completeness
we apply to knowledge-belief spaces is not ours, this a simple variant of
Brandenburger (2003)’s concept. Therefore, since Brandenburger (2003)’s
concept is widely accepted in the literature, perhaps it is not too unreasonable
to check whether this property holds for the universal knowledge-belief space.
On the other hand, one can say that Meier (2008)’s model is futile, not
reasonable, since it does not meet such a basic property as completeness.
However, it is clear that Meier (2008)’s model has some nice properties (e.g.
that there is a universal knowledge-belief space, while e.g. there is no uni-
versal topological type space (Pinte´r, 2010)), so perhaps it is not too unrea-
sonable to use Meier (2008)’s model either.
We do not want to take sides on this matter, we just remark the fact that
the universal knowledge-belief space is not complete.
In order to save space we do not introduce every notion we use in this
paper, so the reader is kindly asked to consult with Meier (2008)’s paper on
the notions not defined in this paper. Needless to say, we give exact reference
for any of the used but not defined notion.
Practically, the paper consists of one section, in which we introduce the
basic notions and notations and give our non-completeness result.
2 The universal knowledge-belief space is not
complete
Throughout the paper, if it is not indicated differently, we use Meier (2008)’s
terminologies and notations. Therefore we use Convention 1., Remarks 1.,
2., 5., Definitions 1., 6., 7., 8., 10. from his paper. Moreover we assume
that the parameter space S is not trivial, that is, the σ-field of S, ΣS, has
cardinality more than two, and that there are at least two players.
First we take Definition 2. from Meier (2008)’s paper.
Definition 1. A knowledge–belief space (kb-space) on S for player set I is a
5-tuple M := 〈M,Σ, (Ki)i∈I , (Ti)i∈I , θ〉, where
1. M is a non-empty set,
2. Σ is a σ-field on M ,
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3. Ki : Σ→ Σ is a knowledge operator1 on (M,Σ), for player i ∈ I,
4. for each i ∈ I: Ti is a Σ-measurable function from M to (∆(M,Σ),Σ∆),
the space of probability measures on (M,Σ),
5. for each m ∈M and E ∈ Σ: m ∈ Ki(E) implies Ti(m)(E) = 1, i ∈ I,
6. for each m ∈ M and E ∈ Σ: [Ti(m)] ⊆ E implies m ∈ Ki(E), where
[Ti(m)] := {m′ ∈M | Ti(m′) = Ti(m)}, i ∈ I,
7. θ is a Σ-measurable function from M to (S,ΣS), the parameter space.
If we put condition ”for each m ∈ M and E ∈ Σ: [Ti(m)] ⊆ E implies
Ti(m)(E) = 1, i ∈ I” in, and drop Points 3., 5. and 6. out of Definition
1. then we get the concept of type space (Heifetz and Samet, 1998b; Pinte´r,
2008), that is, a model where only the beliefs of the players are represented,
their knowledges are not.
Definition 2. Knowledge-belief morphism (kb-morphism) f : M → M ′ be-
tween the kb-spaces 〈M,Σ, (Ki)i∈I , (Ti)i∈I , θ〉 and 〈M ′,Σ′, (K ′i)i∈I , (T ′i )i∈I , θ′〉
is a mapping such that
1. f is Σ-measurable,
2. Diagram (1) is commutative, that is, for all m ∈M : θ′ ◦f(m) = θ(m),
M
M ′
f
? θ′ - S
θ
-
(1)
3. for all i ∈ N Diagram (2) is commutative, that is, for all A ∈ Σ′:
Ki ◦ f−1(A) = f−1 ◦K ′i(A),
Σ′
K ′i - Σ′
Σ
f−1
? Ki - Σ
f−1
?
(2)
1The properties of the knowledge operator is listed in Definition 1. in Meier (2008).
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4. for each i ∈ N Diagram (3) is commutative, that is, for all m ∈ M :
T ′i ◦ f(m) = ∆f ◦ Ti(m),
M
Ti - ∆(M,Σ)
M ′
f
? T ′i - ∆(M ′,Σ′)
∆f
?
(3)
where ∆f : ∆(M,Σ) → ∆(M ′,Σ′) is defined as for each µ ∈ ∆(M,Σ) and
A ∈ Σ′: ∆f (µ)(A) = µ(f−1(A)), i ∈ N .
f kb-morphism is a kb-isomorphism, if f is a bijection and f−1 is also a
kb-morphism.
It is easy to verify that2 the kb-spaces as objects and the kb-morphisms
as morphisms form a category (the parameter space (S,ΣS) is fixed).
Definition 3. The kb-space Ω is universal, if for any kb-space M there is a
unique kb-morphism f from M to Ω.
In the language of category theory the universal kb-space is a terminal
(final) object in the category of kb-spaces. Since every terminal object is
unique up to isomorphism, hence the universal kb-space is also unique up to
kb-isomorphism.
Theorem 4. The universal kb-space exists.
Proof. See Theorem 1. in Meier (2008). 
In other words, Theorem 4 shows that there is a terminal object in the
category of kb-spaces.
Definition 5. The kb-space M is complete, if for each i ∈ I, µ ∈ ∆(M,Σ−i)
there exists m ∈ M such that µ = Ti(m)|(M,Σ−i), where Σ−i := σ(θ−1(ΣS) ∪⋃
j∈I\{i}
Kj(Σ) ∪ ⋃
j∈I\{i}
T−1j (Σ∆))
3.
The above notion of completeness is the natural variant of that Branden-
burger (2003) applies to type spaces.
2The reason for that we use commutative diagrams in Definition 2. is to suggest that
category theory is the right framework for analyzing kb-spaces.
3σ(·) is for the smallest σ-field that contains the given set system.
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Intuitively, a kb-space is complete, if for any player any probability mea-
sure on the descriptions of the other players and the nature represents a
kb-type of the given player. Therefore, if a kb-space is complete, then it
is enough to take the probability measures on it, they give correct and full
descriptions of the beliefs in the kb-types in the model.
As we have already mentioned in the introduction, the (purely measur-
able) universal type space is complete (Meier, 2001), hence it is very desirable
that the universal kb-space be also complete. Unfortunately, it does not hap-
pen.
Theorem 6. The universal kb-space 〈Ω,ΣΩ, (K∗i )i∈I , (T ∗i )i∈I , θ∗〉 is not com-
plete.
Proof. Let E ∈ ΣS be such that E, {E 6= ∅, and ϕ ∈ Φ be the kb-expression
that [ϕ] = θ∗−1(E)4, moreover consider players i, j ∈ I, i 6= j.
Take the following kb-expressions: kj(ki(ϕ)) and kj(ki(¬ϕ)). Then
kj(ki(ϕ))⇒ ki(ϕ)⇒ ϕ
and
kj(ki(¬ϕ))⇒ ki(¬ϕ)⇒ ¬ϕ ,
where⇒ is for the implication. Therefore, [kj(ki(ϕ))], [kj(ki(¬ϕ))] ∈ Kj(ΣΩ)
⊆ Σ−i, and [kj(ki(ϕ))] ∩ [kj(ki(¬ϕ))] = ∅.
Furthermore, Ω is universal kb-space, therefore ki(ϕ) ⇒ ki(ki(ϕ)) (posi-
tive introspection) and that ki(ϕ)⇒ ¬kj(ki(¬ϕ)) imply that for all ω ∈ Ω:
ki(ϕ) ∈ ω ⇒ ki(¬kj(ki(¬ϕ))) ∈ ω ⇒ b1i (¬kj(ki(¬ϕ))) ∈ ω
⇒ ∀p ∈ (0, 1] : ¬bpi (kj(ki(¬ϕ))) ∈ ω .
Analogously, ¬ki(ϕ) ⇒ ki(¬ki(ϕ)) (negative introspection) and that ¬ki(ϕ)
⇒ ¬kj(ki(ϕ)) imply that for all ω ∈ Ω:
¬ki(ϕ) ∈ ω ⇒ ki(¬kj(ki(ϕ))) ∈ ω ⇒ b1i (¬kj(ki(ϕ))) ∈ ω
⇒ ∀p ∈ (0, 1] : ¬bpi (kj(ki(ϕ))) ∈ ω .
Then we get at that for all ω ∈ Ω ([ki(ϕ)] ∪ [¬ki(ϕ)] = Ω), p ∈ (0, 1):
bpi (kj(ki(ϕ))) ∧ b1−pi (kj(ki(¬ϕ))) /∈ ω .
4See Definition 10. in Meier (2008).
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Therefore, if µ ∈ ∆(Ω,Σ−i) such that (p = 12)
µ([kj(ki(ϕ))]) = µ([kj(ki(¬ϕ)))]) = 1
2
,
then @ω ∈ Ω: µ = Ti(ω)|(M,Σ−i), that is, the universal kb-space is not com-
plete. 
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